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Abstract
The paper questions the appropriateness of using an “institutionalist” label regarding the
analysis of Michail Tugan-Baranovsky’s (1865-1919) theoretical legacy. It is argued that
Tugan-Baranovsky’s views cannot be considered either the Russian type of Institutionalism
or the national version of the German Historical School (Barnett, 2004) due to their
ideological eclecticism and serious methodological distinctions from the heterodox schools
of thought mentioned above. In particular, the paper discusses Tugan’s views on the course
of societal dynamics which, in the author’s opinion, represent an example of teleological
evolutionarism and lie outside the framework of institutionalist paradigm, and Tugan’s
approach to the value theory as it was summarized in his last (1919) methodological article,
and is ideologically shared with neoclassical economics. It is concluded that
Tugan-Baranovsky should be branded not as an institutionalist or historical economist but as
an eclectic one.
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1. Summary and Introduction 
 
The paper questions the appropriateness of using an “institutionalist” label 
regarding the analysis of Michail Tugan-Baranovsky’s (1865-1919) theoretical legacy. 
The term “institutionalist” here refers primarily to the American institutionalist tradition 
of Thorstein Veblen, John Commons and Wesley Mitchell, which is often called an “old” 
or original institutionalism (Boulding, 1958).  However, the paper mostly focuses on 
institutionalism of Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) since it was his theoretical standpoint 
that has largely determined the methodological core of institutionalist-evolutionary 
doctrine at the time discussed
1 
The main reason for addressing this issue is that modern days Russian and 
Ukrainian scholars quite often do not make a clear distinction between heterodox 
economics in general, that includes Social, Marxian, Historical, Austrian and traditional 
Institutional Economics, among others (Lawson, 2006), and Institutionalist paradigm per 
se, and frequently use terms “heterodox” and “institutional”, or “heterodox” and 
“historical-institutional”, almost interchangeably (Horkina, 1994, Sorvina, 1997, Abalkin, 
2002). Consequently, in the national economic literature Tugan-Baranovsky is branded as 
an institutionalist economist (Sorvina, 1997; Makasheva, 2000) and considered as a 
founder of the “characteristically national way of institutional economic thinking” 
(Horkina, 1994) that includes holistic approach to the economy and emphasis on ethical 
issues and social reforms (Sorvina, 1997; Olsevich, 2002; Sheptun, 2005). 
In addition to Russian-and-Ukrainian-language literature, some recent Western 
publications also declare Tugan Baranovsky as “an institutional …political economist”, 
whose work “shows apparent parallels with an institutional economics in general” 
(Barnett, 2004, pp. 88-89). At the same time, Tugan-Baranovsky is also named “a central 
figure within historical political economy … as a dominant current in Russian economics 
between 1870 and 1917” (Ibid, p. 90). 
In what follows it is argued that Tugan’s doctrine of an “Ethical” Political 
Economy, despite certain ideological similarities with an institutionalist analysis of the 
time, overall did not have a methodological congruity with the latter. Methodological 
congruity here is defined as a compatibility of common ideological principles of 
knowledge formation that serve, in Veblen’s words, as “the basis of valuation of the facts 
for the scientific purpose” (Veblen, [1899] 1961, p.60). Thus, the paper demonstrates that 
Tugan’s analysis of the value theory, particularly as it was summarized in his last (1919) 
methodological article, is ideologically shared with neoclassical economics and, 
therefore, lies outside the framework of Veblenian institutionalism.  Equally, Tugan’s 
views on the course of societal dynamics represent an example of teleological 
Evolutionarism similar to that of German Historical School that also contradicts to open- 
ended, divergent nature of evolutionary dynamics, as it is understood within an 
institutionalist paradigm. It is also argued that due to the methodological distinctions 
between German historicism and traditional institutionalism, clarified above, the labels 
                                                 
1  
As Malcolm Rutherford points out, later on, during the interwar period,  “the main focus of institutionalist research …was not on 
theories of institutional change, but on the pressing problems of the existing economic order; on problems such as… labour relations, 
public utilities, monopoly and business regulation” (2000, p. 295), which implied a shift in institutionalist research from 
methodological issues to the practical core of the doctrine.     2
“historical” and “institutional” cannot be used interchangeably and, thus, the status of 
historical economist does not necessarily imply an institutionalist incline of a scholar.  
Despite the fact that modern institutional literature recognizes that 
“institutionalism has always had a multiplicity of foci and avenues of work” and, 
therefore,  “there is no single uniform institutionalism” or “a litmus test of one’s 
“correct” adherence to institutionalism” (Samuels, 2000, p. 310), the author believes that 
the conceptual coherence of the whole institutionalist structure must be preserved if the 
methodological core that defines different schools is concerned.   
Consequently, the paper suggests considering Tugan-Baranovsky not as 
institutionalist economist but as pluralistic and eclectic scholar, who was open to 
different ideas, including essentially neoclassical ones. Equally, the paper proposes not to 
regard the “Russian school of Ethical Political Economy” as the Russian type of 
Institutionalism but as a primarily eclectic intellectual movement, inclined to historicism 
and Kantian idealism.   
The paper consists of two major parts. The first part (section 2) addresses the 
issue of methodological incongruity between Tugan-Baranovsky’s theoretical viewpoint 
and that of an original institutionalism on the course of societal dynamics, while the 
second part (section 3) analyses Tugan’s theory of value as a manifestation of his 
teleological perspective.   
 
2. Veblenian Institutionalism, German Historicism and Tugan-Baranovsky’s 
“Ethical Political Economy” on the course of a society’s changes 
 
From the time of its origin about 1890s Veblenian institutionalism was not an 
isolated heterodox teaching but “part of a much larger movement of dissent” that, in 
words of Kenneth Boulding,  “includes London School Institutionalists, Oxford 
Antimarginalists and the German Historical School (especially its second generation)” 
(Boulding, 1958, pp.3-5). Fundamentally, the key thing, from which  “dissenters 
dissented”, was the individualist-rationalistic perspective of neoclassical tradition and 
notion of economic individuals as the given, non-institutionalized and a-historical. 
 Particularly, the German Historical School is recognized for its “allegiance to an 
inductive, empiricist approach to economic theory, and hostility to a deductive, axiomatic 
economics” (Tribe, 2003, p.215) as well as for its holistic methodology and strong 
critique of the laissez-faire policies (Landreth and Colander, 2002). In words of John 
Commons, “The Historical School led to the Ethical and institutional schools” (1934, p. 
115).  
Veblen carried the same interdisciplinary perspective to his analysis of economic 
theory, however, his pioneering role in the formation of a distinctively institutionalist 
doctrine lies in the fact that he intended to challenge the authority of the prevailing 
neoclassical orthodoxy not from the position of historicism and inductivism, but from the 
perspective of economic evolution based upon institutional change. 
The key distinction between methodological viewpoints of Veblenian 
institutionalism and the German Historical School consists in their opposite 
understanding of the process of mankind’s evolution.  Veblen criticized the Historical 
School for “following the lines of pre-Darwinian speculations on development” ([1898] 
1961, p.72), emphasizing that “no economics is father from being an evolutionary science   3
than the received economics of the Historical School” (Ibid, p. 58). To Veblen, the main 
deficiency of the Historical Economics’ approach lies in its idealistic and romanticist 
bias, rooted in the Hegelian metaphysics (([1901] 1961, p.259). The latter implies belief 
in absolute idealism and conviction that history is tending toward a final destination in 
which will be a complete spiritual harmony between interests of the individuals and the 
common interests of the community (Hegel, [1807] 1977).  In terms of social evolution, 
this concept suggests that society is moving toward a definite, a-priory predestined social 
construction that appears as a function of a moral, spiritual, choice made and shared by 
all of society’s members.  Gustav von Schmoller (1838-1917), the leader of the second 
generation of the Historical School, called his idealistic conception of evolution the 
“historico-ethical” (Schumpeter, 1954, p.812).  Referring to the Kantian teleological 
perspective, Schmoller asserted that morality was embedded in institutions, determining 
the path of their evolution and corresponding directions of a society’s economic 
development. To Schmoller, society is assumed to have certain teleological ends, and 
individuals are believed to behave as if they were purposefully serving these ends 
(Schmoller, 1911, p.437, cited in Shionoya, 2001, p. 14), thus converging to the ethically 
justified pre-ordained social structure.    
Veblen criticized this teleological vision of German Historicism, juxtaposing it to 
the Darwinian concepts of cumulative causation and divergent character of evolution. To 
Veblen “it is this cumulative process of development, and its unstable outcome, that are 
to be the economist’s subject matter” ([1901] 1961, p.267).  In his central methodological 
article “Why is Economics is not an Evolutionary Science” Veblen emphasizes that “the 
economic life history of the individual is a cumulative process of adaptation of means to 
ends that cumulatively change as the process goes on, both the agent and environment 
being at any point the outcome of the last process” ([1898], 1961, p. 75). Contrasting the 
presumption of a natural as well as teleological order, Veblen clarifies, “in order to search 
for a tendency [in events], we must be possessed of some notion of a definitive end to be 
sought, or some notion of a legitimate trend of events. The notion of a legitimate trend 
…is an extra-evolutionary preconception, and lies outside the scope of an inquiry into the 
casual sequence of any process” (Ibid, p. 76).  
As a non-teleological evolutionist, Veblen understands: ”The evolutionary point of view 
…leaves no place for a formulation of natural laws in terms of definitive normality, 
whether in economics or in any other branch of enquiry. Neither does it leave room for 
that other question of normality, what should be the end of the developmental process 
under discussion” (Ibid).  
Veblen also rightly concludes that German school’s teleological Evolutionarism is 
very similar to the Marxist “Materialistic Conception of History”, which, through 
dialectic sequence, animistically imputed purposes and inevitability to the social 
progress, and, therefore, also lies outside the framework of evolutionary economics 
([1901] 1961, p.260; [1906] 1961, pp. 416-417). Veblen made it explicit that “it could 
not, without an infusion of a pious fancy by the speculator, be asserted to involve 
progress as distinct from retrogression…neither could it conceivably be asserted to lead 
up to a final term, a goal to which all lines of the process should be converged and 
beyond which the process would not go… In Darwinism there is no such final or perfect 
term, and no definitive equilibrium” (Veblen, [1906] 1961, pp. 416-417).   4
This Veblenian critique of teleological nature of both German historicism and 
Orthodox Marxism is very much in line with the later (1954) Schumpeter’s analysis of 
teleology, in which Schumpeter elucidates that teleology is “the attempt to explain 
institutions and forms of behaviour causally by the social need or purpose they are 
suppose to serve” (1954, p. 58n). Schumpeter emphasized, “an improper use of teleology 
in research program may lead to exaggerating the extent to which men act, and shape the 
institutions under which they live, according to clearly perceived end that they 
consciously wish to realize in the most rational way” (1954, p. 58n). 
From this position of coherent differences between teleological Evolutionarism of 
German Historicism and non-teleological, open-ended evolutionary perspective of 
traditional institutionalism on the course of societal progress, we can realistically evaluate 
whether Tugan-Baranovsky’s standpoint on the subject was of an institutionalist nature. 
On the one hand, Tugan-Baranovsky in his research also asserted methodological holism 
instead of individualistic reductionism. Being under the strong influence of Kantian 
ethics, Tugan aimed to ground the Russian movement towards modernity on ethical and 
just reasons, and, thus, tried to impose ethical demands on the quality of the social whole, 
believing that it is the latter that influences and conditions individual behaviour rather 
than vice versa. To him, human personality possesses “an absolute… and infinite value” 
([1908] 1996, p. 24-25) and, therefore, political economy should treat the material means 
of nurturing the human personality as “the supreme goal of any economic activity” (1909, 
p.14).   
On the other hand, the impact of Kantian ethics with its emphasis on the 
autonomy of the will as well as on the priority of a theory over empirical enquiry 
(epistemology over ontology) has led to Tugan’s disillusionment with an orthodox 
Marxism and his subsequent opting for spirituality over materialism and teleology over 
positivism and rationalism. Consequently, Tugan joined the movement of so called “God 
builders”, in which he actively participated in creating a special ideology, called  
“socialist religion”, that has been based on premises that God is created by humanity to 
express its own aspirations and the final goal of economic and political development is 
the establishment of the Kingdom of God on Earth (Bohachevsky-Chomiak, 1990). In 
line with this approach, Tugan viewed socialism as a “moral ideal of the human race”, 
and believed that it could be intentionally constructed to provide material base for the 
“emancipation of human personality” and its further “comprehensive development” 
([1918] 1996, p.265, 271).  
 It is important to stress that Tugan’s fascination with Kantian idealist ethics 
predictably led to the teleological incline in his research and, thus, to a firm belief in a 
possibility to portray the final outcome of an evolutionary process. In his essay on Prudon 
Tugan criticized Marxism for not offering the constructive, “positive”, concept of the 
future economic order and for the general lack of distinctive ideas about the postcapitalist 
economic systems ([1902], 1996, p. 163) A similar critique has been also addressed to 
anarchist communists.  At the same time Tugan heavily praised utopian socialists for 
their “ambition to foresee modern society’s gravitation point”, and considered their 
“configuration of new social order as the largest achievement of social thought in the 
XIX century” (Ibid). Clarifying on the necessity of having a full account of socialist 
system, Tugan explain that in order to value socialism, one has to envisage it since “one 
cannot like something he does not know about “ ([1912] 1996, p. 82).    5
In his collection of essays ‘For a Better Future” (1912) and subsequently 
published “Socialism as a Positive Teaching” (1918) Tugan presented his vision of 
socialist economy as such in which exploitation has been abolished, and means of 
production are collectively owned in forms of state, municipal, cooperative and 
individual ownership. The degree of state ownership should remain substantial only in 
industry; while in agriculture peasant proprietorship and partial cooperation must prevail. 
Each producer receives an income proportional to his contribution, individual 
consumption is regulated by income, and no one can live on rent, interest or profit 
([1918] 1996, pp.258-303). Tugan believed that the socialist state alongside with local 
municipalities, cooperatives and trade unions, “will establish proportionality between 
production and consumption” and reconcile “social reality with the moral ideal of social 
freedom” (Tugan-Baranovsky, [1906] 1966, pp. 230-232).  Overall, Tugan’s views on 
social ideal were quite similar to those of German cateder-socialists (King, 1993), and 
showed a strong influence of German Historicism.  
Contrary to this, Veblen has clearly distinguished between teleological envision 
of the future economic order and institutionalist open-ended (divergent) type of societal 
evolution.  Veblen wrote:” in the Darwinian scheme of thought, the continuity sought in 
and imputed to the facts is a continuity of cause and effect. It is a scheme of blindly 
cumulative causation, in which where is no trend, no final term, and no consummation. 
The sequence is controlled by nothing but the Vis a tergo of brute causation” (Veblen, 
1907, p. 437). 
Therefore, in analytic terms Tugan-Baranovsky’ conception of societal dynamics 
is entirely opposite to that of Veblenian institutionalism. Tugan’s understanding of the 
course of social progress as predetermined and conscious movement toward the foreseen 
ideal reflects romantic Hegelianism and Kantian idealism, while in Veblen’s view 
societal evolution is explained by Darwinian Canon which stresses cumulative causation 
and instinctive, unintentional adjustment in social and economic changes that, as a result, 
are not predestined.   
From our viewpoint, the problem of the nature and course of mankind’s evolution 
constituted one of the central and distinctive themes in emerging institutionalist paradigm 
at the time discussed, hence, it is concluded that Tugan-Baranovsky’s views on the 
subject definitely were not of an institutionalist-evolutionary nature.  
 
3. Tugan Baranovsky’s theory of value as a manifestation of his teleological 
perspective 
   
It is well known that during the mature period of his career Tugan-Baranovsky 
supported the marginalist approach in the controversy over method, considering the 
neoclassical theory of value  “a general phenomenon of spiritual life” and “the pride of 
modern economic science” (Tugan-Baranovsky, [1919] 1977, pp. 197, 207). He also 
believed that  “in the future the economic theory of value will have no less a significant 
impact on natural sciences [than the theory of the struggle for existence] (Ibid, p. 207). 
It is interesting to note that if initially Tugan-Baranovsky tried to reconcile a labour 
theory of value with neoclassical utility analysis (1890, 1909), later on, in his final 
methodological article on the question (1919), cited above, he fully allied himself with 
marginalism and its focus on rational individuals and attained equilibrium states.    6
To him, the strength of marginalism lies primarily in its “economic principle”, according 
to which  “man in his economic activity should aim at gaining the highest result with the 
lowest expenditure of effort” (Ibid, p. 197). Tugan emphasized that what is more 
economical has a greater survival value and believed that in the future “economic theory 
of value will become a source of new theoretical constructions in the sciences which deal 
with phenomena appearing as the result of the struggle of organisms for existence” (Ibid, 
p. 208). He also valued an abstract-theoretical method of neoclassical economics for 
allowing an “application of mathematical methods”, which reduce “our mental efforts” 
and, therefore, become “a necessary tool for our thinking” (Ibid, p. 197). In words of 
Nove, “In general, Tugan accepts that what the thinkers of the marginal school say is true 
as far as it goes”(1970, p.256). 
On the one hand, such Tugan’s preoccupation with the marginalist approach 
seems to contradict to the holistic and anti-reductionist methodology of his “Ethical 
doctrine”.  On the other hand, and this is what the paper argues, Tugan’s appreciation of 
neoclassical methodology stems from the unique point of congruence between Hegelian 
metaphysics, socialist doctrine and neoclassical theory, which consists in their common 
teleological method and shared belief in the uniqueness and certainty of the pre-ordained 
equilibrium, or the Future.  In words of Tugan, “from the modern viewpoint, the intellect 
is an organ, created by will, it is a servant of the will, a tool of the organism used in its 
struggle for existence and developed in the course of this struggle… Economic interest is 
urgent but at the same time it is the simplest interest, which permits quantitative 
measurements.  Hence economic science arrives at generalizations embracing generally 
the whole field of teleological activity of the will”([1919] 1977, p.208). 
Contrary to Tugan’s perspective on neoclassical methodology, original 
institutionalism has dissented from the marginalist principle first of all due to considering 
the latter to be foundational to the teleological nature of the neoclassical standpoint. 
Veblen blamed neoclassicism for “looking to a final term, a consummation of the 
changes that provoked their inquiry” ([1908a] 1961, pp. 36-37), while considering 
economic agents an instant calculators of “pleasures and pains” in their search for 
optimal equilibrium states ([1898, 1961, p. 73).  To Veblen, the purposive voluntarism of 
equilibrium economics lies in the fact that its “Order of Nature, or realm of Natural Law, 
is not the actual run of material facts, but the facts so interpreted as to meet the needs of 
the taxonomist in points of taste, logical consistency, and the sense of justice” ([1908b] 
1961, p. 191). Veblen opposed voluntarism of teleological approach to causal analysis 
and “the genetic account of the phenomena”, emphasizing that “genetic inquiry into the 
scientific point of view necessarily will have to make up its account with the earlier 
phases of cultural growth”, which includes the impact of institutions on economic life 
([1908a] 1961, p. 40). Walton Hamilton, one of the leaders of American Institutionalist 
Thought after World War I, advocating the need of a change in the language of 
Economics, expected this change to be sufficiently profound in order to ensure that 
“economic theory will cease to mean value theory” (Hamilton, 1918, p. 407). 
Regarding Tugan-Baranovsky’s assessment of the future of neoclassical 
methodology, it is also worth noting, that it sounded very similar to what fifty years later 
has become known as economic (or economics) imperialism that implies that economics 
is not only a social science, but a genuine science with a methodology capable of 
invading various intellectual fields (Becker, 1976; Lazear, 2000).  To Tugan, “in all cases   7
where it is necessary to explain an expedient adjustment of an organism, the explanation 
should be based on the economic theory of value, because economic valuation in nothing 
other than an accounting of expediency. Any teleology, whether related to the external 
structure of the organism or to the inner psychic experiences, is based on the phenomena 
of evaluation” ([1919] 1977, p. 206).  
The above claim also reveals a more general connection between Marginalism 
and non-Marxian Socialism along the line suggested by King, who argued: “some 
important elements of neoclassical theory pointed in a socialist direction” (1993, p. 186). 
A similar viewpoint has been also expressed by Steedman, who admitted that, with 
regard to Socialism and Marginalism, “the mutual relationship involved were complex, 
sometimes of conflict and sometimes of complementarity” (1995, p. 1). With respect to 
Tugan-Baranovsky, it can definitely be said that he considered socialism and constrained 
maximization economics rather compatible than different. Thus, Tugan envisaged the 
applicability of a deductivist marginalist method to the future task of socialist economic 
planning and command governance. To him, concepts of marginal cost and marginal 
benefit “elaborate methods of more precise accounting for those … processes which it 
deals with” and, therefore, in the future man will be “especially interested in a through 
accounting of everything related to conditions underlying the satisfaction of all life 
needs” ([1919] 1977, p. 207). He emphasized that “only because of the quantitative 
commensurability of the value do economic computations acquire that precise and 
definite nature necessary for economic success” (Ibid, pp. 207-208), which is particularly 
important for central economic planning in constructed socialism ([1918], 1996, p. 363). 
Tugan’s marginalist inclination as well as his attempt to connect marginalism and 
socialism illustrates an additional important point of disagreement between Veblenian 
non-teleological and non-taxonomic analytical approach and hedonistic meliorative 
nature of Tugan’s theoretical analysis. The latter has fully revealed itself in Tugan’s 
submission to marginalist methodology in order to substantiate viability and superiority 
of socialist economic order as a predestinarian ideal that mankind inevitably approaches.  
Overall, the above analysis reconfirms the paper’s main assertion that Tugan-
Baranovsky should be branded not as an institutionalist economist but as an eclectic one.  
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